The proliferation of qualitative methods in educational research has !ed to considerable controversy about standards for the design and conduct of research. Thzs controversy has been playing itself out over the last several decades largely in terms of the quantitativequalitatzve debate. In this paper we argue that framzng the issue of standards m terms of quantztative-quahtatzve debate zs mzsguided. We argue instead that the problem of standards--for qualitative and quantitative research--is best framed in terms of the "logzcs in use" associated with various research methodologies. In particular, rather than being judged ,n terms of qualitatme versus quantitative paradigms, logics in use, which are often drawn from other academic disciphnes and adapted for the purposes of educational research, are ]udged in terms of thezr success in investigating educational problems deemed important. Finally, we proffer five general standards that can apply to educational research of all kinds.
U ntil 20 years ago, qualitative methodology lacked a history within educational research; not surprisingly, its appearance on the scene prompted concerns about ~ts legitimacy. These concerns have continued, both inside and outside of qualitative research practice. For instance, Rist (1980) , himself a qualitahve researcher, admonished the educational research community to beware of "blitzkrieg ethnography"; Phillips (1987a) , a philosopher, resisted that the "concern with warrant won't wane" (p. 9). Like Rist and Phillips, we worry that in their eagerness to embrace qualitative methods, many educational researchers do not provide adequate and clear justifications for their methods, findings, or condusions. In our esttmation, that justificahons are often inadequate or unclear is due in no small measure to confusion about how best to think about standards for qualitative research design and analysis. We do not mean to suggest that no one has provided useful discussions of standards for qualitative research, much less that no such standards exist. We mean to suggest instead that various aspects of the discussion of standards, particularly its epistemological aspects, stand in need of clarification if the discussion is to proceed in the most fruitful way.
Initially, the debat____~e about the legit~.~acy of qualitative research in education was cast in terms of a stark but vaguely characterized choice between an entrenched quantitative methodology and a highly suspect newcomer. The debate has since evolved into ~tinct strand. The firststrand, exemplified by thinkers such as Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Smith and Heshusius (1986) , refined the early debate by ~guishmg between re es_earch_m.¢t, hods on one hand and e~.istemologies on the other. According to this view, the stark cFfoice extsts now as much as ever; however, ~t is not a choice between quantitative and qualitative methods but between the ~ and ~ (no npositivist) epistemologies that putatively underlie alternative research paradigms. For these thinkers, justifying qualitative research consists of rigidly distinguishing positivist and alternahve epistemologies and then defending the legitimacy of the latter.
The second strand of argument, exemplified by thinkers such as Denzin (1989) , Erickson (1982 Erickson ( , 1986 , and Goetz and LeCompte (1984) , largely left the original debate behind, as well its more recent refinements. For these thinkers, attention is focused on the particulars of various research methodologies rather than on abstract epistemology. Accordingly, justifying qualitative rese~-ch-l~gely consists of developing and articulating methodological design and analysis standards rather than of fending off positivistic challenges.
Because of these two ve .ry_different ways of approaching the problem, the current discussion of standards for qualitative design and analysis is at an impasse. In particular, thinkers working on the development and articulation of standards pay relatively little attention to the demand to frame their recommendations in terms of the positivistalternative paradigm split; as a consequence, they are characterized as g!ossing over deeper epistemological issues, of capitulating m~t works, and even of embracing positivism (Smith & Heshusius, 1986) . ~O~br aim in this paper is to offer some preliminary observations--a prolegomenon--with an eye toward mov-KENNETH HOWE and MARGARET EISENHART are at the School of Education, Universgy of Colorado, Boulder, This work may be downloaded only. It may not be copied or used for any purpose other than scholarship. If you wish to make copies or use it for a non-scholarly purpose, please contact AERA directly.
ing the discussion beyond its current ~ Ourarguments will proceed in~s.
F~t, we-~ill defend the second strand by arguing that a self-conscious episte-~stification for this approach is readily available: Its adherents merely need to explicitly dismiss the demand contained in the first strand of argument that the epistemological debate must be couched in terms of the positivistalternative paradigm split.
Second, we will examine various issues concerning standards for qualitative research within a nonpositivist framework. We will claim that a variety of sp~ards are legitimate, because standards must be linked to the different-and legitimate--disciplines, interests, purposes, and expertise that fall under the rubric of qualitative research. We will use examples from educational ethnography in order to illustrate the nature of disputes wlthm a parhcular qualitative tradition and to show that such disputes, though important, should be disentangled from disputes about the general value of a piece of research for education.
Fin o..~l~, we will advance fiv,,fiX.g~ery general standards that might be applied to the design and analysis o~-q-~aqualitative educational research. Given the shape that our arguments take, we will suggest that these standards need not be confined to qualitative research in particular, but can and should apply to quantitahve research as well (thus the reference to quantitatwe in the rifle). We emphasize qualitative standards because this is where the debate about standards has been, and will likely continue to be, focused.
Strand 1--The Positivist Alternative Paradigm Split: A Procrustean Bed
Procrustes was a legendary robber of ancient Greece who h'~'d ~ ~abit of c~etching his victims legs, depending on their height, to make them fit his bed. Thinkers attempting to work out standards for research methods make a procrustean bed of thetr own when they construe explicatingstandards as an exercise in epistemological foundations. The basic approach is to characterize positivist and alternative paradigms respectively in terms of various dichotorrues--facts versus values, objectivity versus subjectivity, fixed categories versus emergent categories, the outsider's perspective versus the insider's perspective, a static reality versus a fluid reality, causal explanation versus understanding--and to identify qualitative research with the characteristics associated with this alternative paradigm (e.g., Guba, 1987; Lincoln & Guba, 1985 Smith, 1983a Smith, , 1983b ~ Heshusius, 1986) . Stgndard__s for'~qu itative research are then ~z_¢ut down, as the case may be, to fit the alternative_ paradigm. Insofaras__qu_alitative research gets associated with an epistemolo~ical p_aradi~m.that rejects things like facts and obj-e~ffVi~, iTbeco~--'~mes---~]'nera~-e to the famili~ ~is-hopelesslyl_subjective , unscientific, relativistiC, dnd is virtuall);-wifh-o-ut any standards at all.
This problem regarding standards of warrant, supposedly peculiar to qualitative research, can largely be avoided by recognizing that the strategy of articulating standards against a positivistic epistemological backdrop is by no means an obviously legitimate one. In this vein, several educational philosophers (e.g., Garrison, 1986; Howe, 1985 Howe, , 1988 Phillips, 1983 Phillips, , 1987b have argued that philosophy of science has moved into a p.ost-or non__Eositivisti c~ era in which positivism i....._, s no longer a tenable e.____piste___mological position. Given this new~y of science, no social research (nor even physics for that matter) is accurately portrayed by positivism, and thus positivism should not serve as the foil against which standar~litative research should be developed. This point deserves some further elaboration. P~as initially conceived as partly a des_.~iptio.n of, and partly a pr~scriptio_n for, the c~t of naL.~.tu~l sciences. In K~1964) phraseology, it was '~ ~d lo~iG ~' In the arena of natural science, practicing sOentists q-~d both aspects of positivism, and were guided instead by what Kaplan refers to as "logic in use." That positivism so badlwfailed as a recons~c_..C.~ logic of natural science ~nnd that it w~ l~-r~_~ly i~nored by natural scientists makes it somewhat ironic that it has been taken so seriously by social scientists; but take it seriously they did, especially in ps cy_Gholog~, were positivism was embraced as an accurate portrayal of the scientific method, and then was cashed out in the form of methodological behaviorism (e.g., MacKenzie, 1977) .
John Passmore observed (in 1967 no less) that "logi-ca~ dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes" (In Phillips, 1987b, p. 37) . Although positivism no doubt still has a powerful influence on social and educational research, it can no longer claim to be based on a viable epistemology. For, the core t.e~, venficationism, has been thoroug~y repudiated. In general, the picture of empirical science envisioned by positivism, in which obs~tion could be strictly separated from and remare untainted by t Lh_e_purposes that animate the conduct and evaluation of scientific investig~ion, has-~-~-~n repla-~ed by the notion that all scientific investigation is inherency theory-laden. Consequently, because all soentiflc investigation is inherently laden with theory, inherently an outgrowth of human pu~oses an eoretica] constructions, It ts, broadly spe--~g, inhe--~entlv inter~£~t~ 2 (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Rorty, 1982) . Thus, there is no good reason for educational researchers to attempt to legitimate an alternative paradigm so that it might peacefully coexist with positivism. Indeed, there are good reasons for not doing this, inasmuch as it merely serves to encourage the view that positivism is a worthy competitor.
Abandoning: pj_itivism__.__ddoes not entail abandoning standards of objectiwty and rationality in empirical researc-h-~; it en'f~il's instead that such standards be understood in a nonpositivist w_w. 9. . y. :
In particular, the question of standards mu-----U-~ be~ed wholly within an in~tive, broadly construed. Furthermore, insofar as no standards completely divorced from human judgments, purposes, and values can exist and insofar as there can, accordingly, be no monolithic unity of scientific method--those were the pipe dreams of positivism--standards must be anchored wholly within the process of inquiry. As K aplan remarks in the opening paragraph of the Conduct ofI_nquiry_ (1964) , "the pur~t of truth is accountable t~tHi~: and no one not a part of the pursuit itself (p. 3). As he adds a few pages later, standards governing the conduct of inquiry in any of its phases emerge from the inquiry an~l:lemselv.es_subje~t-to-further inquiry" (p. 5). The question of standards for qualitative research--indeed, for research of any kind--is, then, a,.~.~ one, and,one that must be answered in terms of the successes and failures of inquiry. In turn, successes and failures can only be judged relative to given purposes.
Strand 2--Reformulating the Problem: Logics in Use
Kaplan's focus on the standards that are actually employed in social research, standards that he associates with logic in use, is consistent with other thinkers like Bernstein (1983), who urges researchers to overcome the tyra~thod, and Rorty (1979) , who urges them to give up the notion of an Archemedian point which might serve as a fail-safe criterion against which to evaluate standards. What happens Positivism was conceived as a description of, and a prescription for, the conduct of natural sciences.
when the tyranny__qf method and the quest for an Archemedlan point are abandoned in favor of w ork~ use?
The Proliferation of Standards
One consequence of this general nonpositivist stance is that, insofar as methodology ultimately must be tied to research purposes, it must accordingly respond to the variety_gf_p_ur-
poses that exist. Thus, legitimate research methodologies may a~ould proliferate. That social research methodologies may legitimately proliferate is especially pertinent to educational research• For, as Shulman (1988) has observed, education is a field of ~rather than a discipline. That is, it must bring to bear other disciplines--psychology, sociology, and anthropology, to name a few--on educational problems. Consequently, the ways of thinking about methodologies that exist in any one of these disciplines.es _multip_ly and overlap when it comes to educational research.
For example, quahtative researchers who draw on Denzin's work, The r~arch act: A theoretical_Introduct~on to 'o-S-6~logzcal Methods (1989) , are advised to consider the methods of p~bseyvation, naturalistic inquiry, sociological interviewing, and biography m light of the research purposes of symbolic interactiorusm. Those who draw on the work of Goetz and LeCompte, Ethnography and Qualitative Design in Educatlonal Research (1984) , are asked to consider most of the same methods in light of the research purposes of ethnography. Smith and Glass, in Research and Evaluation in Education and the Social Sczences (1987) , discuss a few of the same methods with respect to the purposes of naturalistic inquiry. Although many of the procedures these authors describe are identical, their use in conjunction with theory varies, and their strengths and weaknesses, given certain purposes, are different• In defining and illustrating their particular methodologies, all of these authors have written about standards for assess-Ing quality and rigor. These standards, like the selection of the methods themselves, are related to the theoretical orientation of the authors. This state of affairs illuminates the problem in our search for a way to think and talk about standards for qualitative research: Except at a very high level of abstraction, it is frultless~_Lo__to try_to set_st~Ktar~~ve ressgar~h--per-se. Even when the focus within qualitative research is significantly restricted, the issues associated with standards are quite complex and extensive. We will use educational ethnh_nograph_y as a case in point. (We emphasize that educational ethnography is but one research tradition, and that we are using it only to illustrat~--'more general features of the nature of standards in educational research.)
Standards in Educational Ethnography: An Illustration
When Rist (1980) expressed his concern that the growing use of ethno~'~hy by educational researchers was becoming a mutating movement of an undisciplined mob, he used the term bl~-refer to the work of self-styled ethno~gra_phers-wlio were not trained in or had not studied the method, who-di~e emphasis on exploring the cultural framework of the group or organizahon in question, and who used vanous means to reduce the time and uncertainty of traditional fieldwork. Rist worried that the blitzkrieg ethnographer, by not "accepting the domain and underlying assumptions that have heretofore guided the method [is] essentially...free to improvise and relabel [almost anything] as a new form of ethnography" (p. 9). At the same time, Wolcott (1980) voiced a related concern.
Although we understand the worry about labeling anything ethn6graphy, we think it is important to observe that neither the domain-and underlymgassumptions nor the preferred techniques of eth_hnography have remained fixed and uncontested through twh-6?The recent.writings of Marcus and Fischer (1986), Geertz (1988) , and Clifford (1988) illustrate the profound effects of social history and theoretical development on definitions and standards for ethnography. Clifford points out that ethnography has variously been a methodology to describe, to explain, and to interpret; that it has been at some points in time fundamentally historical, at other points ahistorical; that it has sometimes emphasized the natural scientist's external observation and at other times emphasized the cultural insider's interpretations and practices. Geertz describes how different ways of "being there," that is, the ethnographer's warrant for the authenticity of his or her account, have been enacted in the works of Benedict, Levi-Strauss, Evans-Pritchard and Malinowski. Geertz (1988) does not present ethnography as a fixed set of rules and procedures but as a series of challenges:
Finding somewhere to stand in a text that is supposed to be at one and the same time an intimate view and a cool assessment is almost as much of a challenge as gaining the view and making the assessment in the first place. (p. 10)
Methodological priorities and concerns held over from the recent past are being challenged and in some cases giving way to new ones. This drift--this evolution of logic in use--is occurring for both theoretical and practical reasons, and may be illustrated with two examples of recent ethnographic research• These examples also make two additional points about the general nature of research standards• First, a methodology must be judged by how well it informs research purposes, at least as much as by how well it matches a set of conventions. Second, what counts as good educational research wtll not necessardy match what counts, at any given point in time, as orthodox methodology; for methodology must respond to the different purposes and contexts of research• Example 1.___~e first example comes from the work of 89). Roman set out to conduct an ethnographic • She b_. egan the study as a project in a class taught by an anthropologist of education• She conscientiously intended to use conventional ethnographic methods as presented in the class: gradually participating in the lives of the punk rockers ("going native") by unobtrusively observing them ("like a fly on the wall") and talking with them. She soon realized, however, that these conventional ethnographic methods were inconsistent with her theoretical and political commitment as a feminist materialist. She writes, I discovered in the course of doing the field work that these...conventions for describing or conveying the appropriate role of an ethnographer actually had the undesirable effect of reproducing my relation to the young iav6-~--P~uflxks th-rb'-ugh---F~ms o~l~s privilege and gendered viewing (the distant but fascinated researcher), which I call respectively, "intellectual tourism" and "voyeurism" (p 7). [This situation] required me to confront a new set of ethical and political dilemmas regarding the level and nature of my involvement m the daily gender and class issues facing the young women. On many occasions the young women themselves demanded that I respond to the particular condxtions and situations facing the~-i~-their gender relations with the male Punks or in class relations among themselves. I found o'do~n t ese occasions that it was simply impossible and politically untenable to remain a silent or passive observer. (p. 13)
After considerable thought about the bases of conventional ethnographic standards, her own methodological and ethical requirements, and the everyday reality of the punk women (including their experfiiences oLas~ault and subordination in their families and subculture), Roman change'd-lqeer_r, esearch design. She dropped her stance as a neutral or passive researcher and as a thorouKhlySa-nmersed participant obs ~_,~. She began to search for ways to meet with the punk women without the men present (unusual in this group) and to participate with the women in defining their~gende~r-and class opt(this participation was unnatural, i.e., a disruption of the ordinary course of events or interpretation). As she formed tentative ideas about the women as a group, she shared these ideas with the women, elicited their responses, and further tried to alter their ways of thinking about their lives. Roman has called her methodology "feminist materialis.t ethno~Tap__bhy," to distinguish it from conventional o~alis ffc ethnography. Some have questioned whether Roman's work is truly ethnographic? The issue seems to be that although her study was about the culture of a small group of punks, her methodology was not recognizable as traditional ethnography. We understand what provokes such questions. There are good reasons to exercise some control over what is to count as an ethnography: If the term is to have any meaning, it has to rule certain things out. Insofar as no Platonic form for ethnography exists, however, what is to count as ethnography is neither given once and for all nor impervious to challenge. Instead, it must be determined by what ethnographers, presumably with good reason and after some debate, decide• Moreover, challenges to the research status quo are not only inevitable; when thoughtfully advanced, such challenges are also healthy. Roman's challenge, for instance, is based on careful consideration of methodological issues in light of her political, ethical, and practical purposes for the research• Her purposes demand a rethinking of conventional procedRres, and why not?-"--"-----Example 2. The second example concerns a d~ stu~an ethnographic study" by its author (Naff, 1987; Naff Cain, 1989) • Thb study was not designed to in-vestiga~ culture per se; rather it was designed as a comparative study of the classroom implementation of two distinctly different teacher planning models•
The research focused on two student teachers, matched on many background charact~t teaching experience. The only (known) relevant diffe ces between the two was the~ught to use. To capture and accour/f-for any differences in the teachers thinking and actions, Naff Cain used 14 sources and methods to collect data about the student tea-~ers training m planning and about their experiences as they planned and implemented a 1-month 12th-grade unit on the l pJKy_King He enry IV To collect these data, Naff Cain chose tools often used by ethnographers, such as ree~, open-ended interviews w~th the student teachers, thetr cooperating teachers, and their students; participant observation in each classroom; videotapes of class sessions in each room; cooperating teacher logs Lstimulated recalls and heuristic elicitations with th~o--~t~achers;
and collection of artifacts such as these data sources and methods, and were analyzecLm two ways also borrowed from ethnographers--semantic domain ~ analysis (Spradley, 1980) and vignette ana-ly~s (suggested by Erickson, 1986, and VanMaanen, 1988) .. Her conclu____sions address the issue with which she began: the differences in teachers and their classrooms that were associated with different planning models. Like Roman's work, Naff Cain's has been cri~ anthropologists for not being ethnography, bu~rent reasons. In Roman's case, the focus of research--culture-is appropriate to study using ethnographic methods, and it is the appropriateness of the alternative methods she used that engenders the controversy about whether the study is truly ethnography. For Naff Cain,.zjust the reverse is true: The methods are technically correct, and it is t~of the research--a comp~o---------b' -ff~n o ~lanning models--that engenders the controversy about whether the study is truly enthography.
Is Naff Cain's study truly an ethnography? Perhaps not. However, it doesn't seem as though answering this question in one way or another is, or should be, crucial for education (presuming, of course, that her methods otherwise yield warranted conclusions). In this connection, and in contrast to the reception by anthropologists, Naff Cain's study has received critical acclaim among educators and educational researchers. It was, for example, the basis for naming her a National Council of Teachers of English (~g Young Researcher in 219_88. It has been used as a model for eth~ rese____aarch in English education and was the imp-e't~s for revisions in several teacher education programs.
The general point we wish to make with the Roman and Naff Cain examples is just this: Fafl..ing to follow a given Neither the domain nor the preferred techniques of ethnography have remained fixed.
theoretical perspective or methodological convention does not necessarily dirmnish the warrant of the conclusions drawn. Although this point might seem altogether obvious--a sociologist can hardly be criticized for failing to observe the methodological canons of physics--it is too easily obscured when researchers work in a recognizable area but, hke Naff Cain, with theoretical orientations or, like Roman, with research methods that are just far enough removed from convention to raise questions about how they should be classified. In these kinds of fuzzy situations (which typically attend innovation), questions of definition and questions of warrant easily become entangled, such that if it is not ethnography (or ethnographic or what have you), then it is not good research. Yet settling the definitional question--Is thts really ethnography? Is this really ethnographic?--cannot settle the question of whether a given piece of educational research is worthwhile. The question that needs to be answered instead is more general: Are waffanted conclusions obtained about some important educational qh-e~ffon--~.TThls~ is the question that ought to frame the pursuit of standards for any educational research.
Standards for Educational Research
We began this paper by expressing our worries about the failure to develop adequate and clear standards in the rush to embrace qualitative methods in educational research. So far, our attention has been focused on just how the question of standards should be framed, for, m our estimabon, this has been a major obstacle to progress. Before turning to the task of proposing several general standards, we will briefly explain three features of them that grow out of our discus-s~st ° far" , any general standards for evaluating educational research will have to be ~act.
Because educational research cuts across many discip m-H-fl'bTand their associated methodologies, and because no one can be expected to be a master of all of the relevant disciplines, general standards will have to incorporate deference to scholars of the various disciplines on issues of methodology and substance peculiar to the disciplines in question. For example, whether Naff Cain's study is ethnography, or whether it effectively applies ethnography's research methods, is up to ethnographers to decide.
Second, notwithstanding the deference to expertise just describe'-"--d, there must be s~ture(s) of educational research that ~ucational and therefore make it of interest and value to educators. The most obvious requirement is that it must focus on educational issues. This rather vague requirement admittedly leaves certain important questions unanswered. For example, must educational research also incorporate a disciplinary (or theoretical) perspective? Is mere description enough, or must improvement be the direct aim? These are just the sorts of questions that Scriven (1986) raises in his call for educational research to adopt an evaluation paradigm and to emulate the medical research model (a model which brackets theoretical understanding in the quest for relatively immediate remedies). Despite the importance and complexity of these questions, here we must set them aside. The five standards we suggest do not presuppose that they be answered in one way rather than another.
Third, as we stated in the introduction, despite our focus on qu ial~ative research (educational ethnography in particular), our arguments are general enoug_h to.apply toquantitative research. This is because our position is staunchly an~fi-T~-or ~v-]st:
i_tt requires all education~----~----"-----alresearch to be--grou-ffded in a ~stemological perspective. Although positivism helped spa~n a set of methods (typically quantitative) such that a v es_h'gial m~hKqdolo~cal.~ is still alive and well, we deny that such methods can be justified by an appeal to positivist epistemology. Instead, such methods must, like qualitative methods, satisfy the kinds of nonpositivist standards we are about to advance. 4
The Fit Between Researches and Data ,Collection and Analysis Techniques j, Putnam remarks, "If you want to know why a square ~to a round hole, you had better not describe the peg in terms of its constituent elementary particles (cited in Rorty, 1982, p. 201) . Although Putnam's target is reductionism in scientific explanation, his remark also has a more prosaic meaning: the d~ectJ.on techniques employed ou ht~, be suitable for answering,.and the research question entertained. Thus, in Naff Cain s plann-~ng study--t~e research questions called for descriptive data permitting comparisons of the two classrooms. Likewise, Roman's emergent, critically oriented research questions demanded a reciprocal, change-oriented design.
A corollary of this~.~standard is that research questions should drive data collection techniques and analysis rather than vice versa--and this is the form in which it is most often violated. Consider what might be termed the quiet desperation syndrome, a disease that attacks the nervous systems of doctoral students. Students who are afflicted begin with a method, "I want to do a qualitative study," "I want to do a MANOVA," and then cast about for a question. Thus, the question of the fit between research questions and data collection techniques gets turned on its head.
Correctl oy__0r~dering research ~ons and methods is, of course, a complex ~ssue. We do not mean to suggest that researchers can proceed as if they are blank slates--free of prior interests, commitments, and methodological expertise-nor as if they have super intellects--capable of competently choosing from all of the relevant questions and methodologies--nor, finally, as if they had available infinite time and resources. In some sense, then, research methodology will indeed drive research In contrast, the degree to which this occurs should be minimized. In our estimation, it is incumbent upon educational researchers to give careful attention to the value their research questions have for informing educational practice, whether it be at the level of pedagogy, policy, or social theory, and then to ground their methodology in the nature of these questions.
The Effective Apphcatwn of,,Specific__DData Collect_don and ~ Techniquces
In addition to coherently linking up with research questions, data collection and analysis techmques also must be competently apphed, in a more or less technical sense. Various principles guide how interviews should be conducted, how instruments should be designed, how sampling should proceed, how data should be reduced, and so forth, such that rather immediate low inference conclusions are rendered credible. If credibility, warrant, is not achieved at this level, then the more general (and interesting) conclusions that ultimately rest on these low inference conclusions will be suspect.
As with the first standard, we do not mean to imply that there are hard and fast rules that must be followed; indeed, such a stance would run counter to much of what we have had to say. We agree with Strauss (1987) that-methodology is best characterized as rules of thumb, that is, "guidelines that should help most researchers in their enterprises" (p. 7), and we could not articulate it better than Strauss himself does:
...researchers need to be alive not only to the constraints and challenges of research settings and research aims, but to the nature of their data They must also be alert to the temporal aspects or phasing of their researches, the openended character of the "best research" in any discipline, the Immense significance of their own experiences as researchers, and the local contexts in which the researches are conducted....Methods, after all, are developed and changed m response to changing work contexts (pp. 7-8).
Alertness to and Coherence of Background Assu~ons '
Linking research questions with data collection techniques and competently applying the latter do not insure that a study will render warranted conclusions, for studies must be ludged against a background of existent knowledge. For example, if the results of one study contradict those of another (or several others), then some sort of explanation of why this occurred is in order. This is where the familiar rewew of the literature comes into play.
Whether some grand social scientific theoretical orientation is employed (e.g., Roman's feminist materialist orientation), or whether research is more specifically focused on pedagogy (e.g., Naff Cain's focus on teacher planning), background assumptions should guide the research questions and methods in a coherent and consistent fashion Perhaps less obvious, and especially relevant to qualitative research, is the researcher's own subjectivity (Peshkin, 1988) . Peshkin has argued that subjectivity is the basis for the researcher's distinctive contribution, which comes from joining personal interpretations with the data that have been collected and analyzed. As with assumptions derived from the literature, subjectwities must be made explicit if they are to clarify, rather than obscure, research design and findings.
Overall Warrant
As we are usmg the term, overall warrant encompasses responding to and balancing the first three standards discussed as we~d them~ngs as being a ~el to and .'~le to em~dge from ~ut-sTd'0 the particular perspective and traclition~lthin which one is working, and bemg able to apply general principles for evaluating arguments.
Although it is difficult (indeed wrong-headed) to try to nail down the notion of overall warrant in a much more precise way, some additional articulation is nonetheless possible. For instance, theories, whether derived from the literature or personal experience, are themselves up for grabs. For this reason, it seems that the most warranted conclusions of which we are capable at any given point in time are those that are drawn after robust and respected theoretical explanations have been tentatively applied to the data--what Denzin (1989) and S hulm.a~ (1988) call "~a~:lg~ datiop by theoryY --and the most plausible one, or some modified version of it, is used to explain the research results. Of course, the warrant of such conclusions also rests on the warrant of the research results, which can be assessed, we have argued, by using the three standards already proposed.
Another way to discuss the ~ssue of overall warrant is to call for discussion of disconfirmed theoretical explanatu:~s and disconfirming ev~, ~986)~-. -When researchers explain the argument~-y--~Vhlc~eorles are rejected and by which disconfirming data are handled, their conclusions are more warranted than when they do not.
Value Constraints
Given the Unt~nnability of the positivist fact-value dogma, there is little reason to suffer from what Scriven (1983) calls "value phobia." The conduct of educational research is subjec-TT6"b-'6"t'h'-O~ernal and internal value constraints (Howe, 1985) .
External value constraints have to do with the

Extern l~.~
worth of re--hung and improving educational pr~o what?" question; that research might possess internal validity is insufficient. Although such judgments of educational worth can be very difficult to make, and have the potential to be exceedingly biased (anyone who has served on a human subjects committee can attest to both of these problems), they are not judgments from which researchers can, or do, forever run and hide--witness the recent exchange in Educational Researcher betweep F F, mr~-(1988) , and Shavelson and Berliner (1988) . It is best to get questions of the worth of research out on the table, lest implicit judgments operate behind the scenes, as a kind of hidden agenda. Clearly/evefi ff others might be puzzled, educational researchers themselves should be able to, and be prepared to, commumc~_ate~_hat value-th~c~K research has (if only potentiallyy'f~ educational practice.
Related to this, the conclusions of educational research ought to be generally accessible to the education community. That is, the language of the results and implications must be in a form that is understandable to, and debatable by, various actors in a particular setting--teachers, administrators, parents, and also educational researchers with varying perspectives and expertise. Accordingly, the research process itself must give attention to the nature of the contexts and individuals it investigates and to which its results might be applied, that is, to their social, political, and cultural features. ~nternal value constraints have to do with research ethics.____ We call research ethics "internal" because they have to do with the way research is coned vis-a-vis research subjects, not with the (external) value of results. For example, Milgram's research on obedience to authority rendered valuable insights regarding the power of researchers to elicit compliance from subjects to perform ethically objectionable actions. The way M~gram ~eated his subjects was highly objectionable, however~uch so that he would nOt be permitted to do his research today. (Ironically, Milgram's findings, at least indirectly, und~ent requirements for informed consent, especially to clearly communic~-e to subjects that they are free to withdraw from research at any time and without penalty.)
Internal value constraints are distinguishable from standards of warrant insofar as observing them sometimes requires reducing warrant. For instance, randomized doubleblind experiments are notorious for the kind of trade-off they engender between the risk-benefit ratio that applies to the subjects of such research and the value of the knowledge that can be obtained for guiding future action. Especially relevant to qualitative research, researchers must weigh the quality of the data they can gather (and whether they can gather any data at all) against principles such as confidentiality, privacy, and truth-telling. Although internal value constraints, research ethics, can be distinguished from more conventional Issues of warrant, they are nonetheless clearly relevant to evaluating the goodness, that is, the acceptability or legitimacy of research designs and procedures.
Conclusion
As we stated at the outset, our aim in this paper has been to offer some preliminary observations that might serve to guide future discussion of standards in qualitative educational research. We did not set out to end the discussion of standards, but to redirect it. We wtll briefly recapitulate our arguments and then offer several general observations about where they leave us.
The common strategy of grounding qualitative research in an alternative paradigm creates a procrus~-=-~-~tself by assuming that it must coexist with positivism. For, once it makes this assumption, it must then define itself as positivmsm's polar opposite, which entails relinquishing to positivism oblectivity, facts, the outsider's perspective, and a host of other concepts that go into making up various dualisms. Refusing to entertain positivism as a viable epistemolobncal doctrine--a refusal that is now univocal within the philosophy of science--is how to avoid this procrustean bed.
Escaping Procrustes' clutches sets the stage for reformulating the prob~lem of standards. Once positivism is removed from the scene, the positivist-alternative paradigm split, along with its various dualisms, collapses; the upshot is that standards must be anchored wholly within an nonpositivist perspective, which is to say they must be anchored nowhere other than in logics in use, in the judgments, purposes, and values that make up research activities themselves. Furthermore, within educational research there are various traditions, each with its own logic in use and its own peculiar disagreements about how methodology should evolve.
Because education is a field of study, which cuts across different logics in use, it presents sp ial, ec.La.Lpx, o~ems regarding standards for research. In particular, general standards for educational research--standards applicable to any research that can be called "educational' '--will have to be relatively abstract a and will have to turn certain questions of standards over to individuals possessing various kinds of expertise. Thus, by its very nature, educational research requires a division of labor. Such a division can take two forms: give-andtake collaboration or insular fragmentation. We surmise that the latter form has too often been the norm. Ou~ral standards, tentative and inchoate as they m~y be, are designed to promote the former.
Notes
'Phdosophers typically use postposttwlsm m a literal sense, and this is what we mean by the term However, because it seems to mean something much closer to neoposltlvism m the education literature, we will use the term nonpos:twlsm in its place By this we mean any wew that embraces the heart of the new phdosophy of science, that all observation is theory-laden As we use the term, then, it includes views as diverse as crmcal theory, pragmatism, and Popperlanlsm 2We recogmze that mterpretwlsm {s often used in a spec]ahzed sense, to indicate an exclusive focus on understanding the insider's perspective We will use the term in a more expansive sense, to mean roughly the same thing as nonposmwsm. We use it m several places instead of nonposmwsm to h,ghhght the tmportant ,mphcatlon that all scientific observation, analysts, and theorizing unavoidably involve acts of interpretation by researchers.
3EIsenhart was present at the 1989 Conference on Qualitative Research in Education, held at the Umverslty of Georgia, when Roman's work, as well Naff Cam's, were questioned Both Roman and Naff Cam have rewewed our interpretation of the responses to therr work at that conference 4Even thinkers who resist that the positiwst-alternatlve paradigm debate is a hve one deny that the purported mcompatlbihty at the paradigm level cames over to the level of quantltatwe versus qualitative methods (e g., Guba, 1987 , Smith & Heshusms, 1986 
